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"Integration is not a value per se, it has no intrinsic connotation; its value lies in what it 
achieves; it becomes noteworthy only to the extent that it works and produces results. This 
may be a hard line to draw, but is the only realistic one".** 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In the past decade, the economic integration process in both North and South Americ  has 
gradually gained momentum and is currently geared up to a new level.1 
The creation of NAFTA between Canada, USA and Mexico in 1994 and its success in 
boosting trade between these countries constitutes an important test case for fur h r 
economic integration in the Americas. Similarly, the recent agreement between the Andean 
Community and Mercosur to create a Free Trade Area (FTA) encompassing virtually the 
whole South American continent shows that the trend towards further regional economic 
integration is accelerating. Besides these two examples, numerous other interesting 
developments have recently taken place, which warrant a closer look. For instance, the 
European Community (EC) and Mercosur are currently negotiating an Association 
Agreement between them. Simultaneously, Chile is negotiating an Association Agreement 
with the EC along the same lines, while Chile has already established FTAs with Mexico 
and Canada as a first step towards joining NAFTA. Meanwhile, the negotiations for the 
creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are making substantial progress and 
it is intended to be established in 2005.2  
These and various other initiatives have created a complicated legal and institutional 
situation.3 Interestingly enough, quite little is known or written about these recent 
developments, particularly in Europe. This is surprising because the EC and Europeans in 
general have many economic and political interests in both North and South America and 
therefore should pay much more attention to what is going on there.  
Accordingly, the aim of this contribution is to give an overview of the most recent 
developments regarding the regional integration process in North and South America.  
In the first part, the three main regional trade blocs (NAFTA, Mercosur and Andean 
Community) will briefly be described and analysed. On that basis, the second part will 
focus on several specific integration initiatives. In particular, I will discuss the planned 
creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the planned FTA between 
Mercosur and the Andean Community, the Association Agreement between Mercosur and 
the EC, as well as the Cooperation Agreement between the Andean Community and the 
EC. In addition, the various link-ups of Chile and Mexico - two strategically important 
countries - will be discussed. 
 
B. Regional Economic Integration in the Americas 
 
I. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
 
1. Current Status of NAFTA 
 
The NAFTA, creating an FTA between Canada, USA and Mexico, was signed in 
December 1992 and entered into force on January 1, 1994.4 NAFTA brings three countries 
together that differ substantially in many aspects. The first obvious aspect is the dominan e 
of the USA in terms of population and economic power. The second aspect is that NAFTA 
links-up a developing country (Mexico) with two developed countries (USA, Canada).5 
Despite these differences, after 5 years, it can be concluded that NAFTA has been 
successful in achieving its main objective, namely, to eliminate tariffs and substantially 
boost trade between its three members.6 The success of NAFTA raised the interest of Chile 
in joining NAFTA as the first Latin American country. Accordingly, Chile established 
FTAs with Mexico and Canada, hoping thereby to facilitate its accession to NAFTA.7 
However, so far the negotiations between Chile and USA have been unsuccessful, because 
of the lack of fast-track authority of the US President and resistance by the US Congress.8  
 
2. The Objectives of NAFTA 
 
As Article 101 NAFTA states, this agreement establishes a Free Trade Area consistent with 
Article XXIV of the GATT.9 According to Article 102 NAFTA, the main objectives of 
NAFTA are to eliminate barriers to trade, to facilitate the movement of goods and services 
and to promote conditions of fair competition. In addition, NAFTA shall increase 
investment, provide effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
create effective procedures for the implementation and application of the treaty as well as 
provide rules for dispute resolution. Moreover, NAFTA shall establish a framework for 
further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits 
of this agreement. The establishment of the FTA shall be achieved primarily through the 
elimination of tariff- and non-tariff barriers as well as the granting of National Treatment to 
imports from the NAFTA member states.  
 
3. The Institutions of NAFTA 
 
Right at the end of the treaty, Chapter 20 deals shortly with the institutions of NAFTA. In 
contrast to the other regional trade blocs discussed below, the parties to NAFTA have been 
reluctant to create organs for NAFTA.10 Hence, NAFTA establishes only two organs: the 
Free Trade Commission and the Secretariat. 
 
a) The Free Trade Commission 
 
Article 2001 NAFTA creates the Free Trade Commission, compromising cabinet-level 
representatives from each Party. The Commission meets at least once a year and all its 
decisions are taken by consensus. The tasks of the Commission are, inter alia, to supervise 
the implementation of the agreement, to resolve disputes that may arise regarding its 
implementation or application and to oversee the work of all committees and working 
groups established under NAFTA. Essentially, all major decisions as regards NAFTA are 
taken by the Parties in the Free Trade Commission. Moreover, the Commission plays a 
particularly important role in the dispute settlement system of NAFTA.11 
 
b) The Secretariat 
 
The Secretariat of NAFTA is established by Article 2002 and consists of national Sections 
of each Party. Each Party establishes a permanent office of its Section and is responsible 
for the operation thereof and all costs arising therefrom. The main task of the Secretariat is 
to provide assistance to the Commission, panels and committees. Besides, the NAFTA 
enumerates several Committees and Working Groups dealing with specific sectors or 
topics.12  
 
4. The Dispute Settlement 
 
The NAFTA treaty emphasises the importance of effective dispute settlement. 
Accordingly, the treaty contains numerous provisions regulating in detail the dispute 
settlement procedures. It is not the purpose of this contribution to discuss the NAFTA 
dispute settlement system in detail.13 Therefore, I will limit myself to giving a short
overview in order to compare it with the dispute settlement systems of Mercosur and the 
Andean Community.  
From the outset it should be noted that NAFTA was negotiated at the same time that the 
Uruguay Round was taking place leading to the WTO Agreement and the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO.14 Consequently, many similarities can be 
found in the two treaties, although substantial differences between the two remain.15 On  of 
the obvious differences between the WTO dispute settlement system and the one of 
NAFTA is that NAFTA does not have one integrated dispute settlement mechanism but 
rather five main procedures. 16 However, so far disputes have only arisen under two
procedures, namely, Chapter 19, which contains the provisions specifically applying to 
disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty matters (Article 1901), and Chapter 20, 
which provides the general rules for the settlement of disputes in all other matters falling 
under NAFTA.17  
Essentially, Chapter 20 contains three main stages that can be distinguished: (i) 
consultation, if the consultation remains unsuccessful after 90 days, (ii) mediation by the 
Commission starts and if that also fails after 90 days, (iii) the Parties can request the 
establishment of a panel. The panel consists of five members that are selected from a roster 
of up to 30 individuals having experience in law, international trade or dispute settlement. 
Within 90 days after the last panellist has been selected, an initial report is presented to the 
parties. The Parties to the dispute can react to the initial report and the panel shall produce 
its final report 30 days after the initial report. The final report is then transmitted to the Free 
Trade Commission, in which the Parties to the dispute negotiate how to implement the 
report. If within 30 days the losing Party fails to implement the panel report, the other Party 
can suspend benefits under NAFTA of equivalent effect until the dispute is settled. Finally, 
if a Party considers the suspension of benefits ‘manifestly excessive’, it can request the 
establishment of a panel to determine whether the suspension of benefits is indeed 
excessive or not.  
This brief overview indicates that the NAFTA dispute settlement is based on detailed rules, 
a panel adjudication system with strict time limits and panel reports that are not directly 
binding on the parties. In other words, the panel report serves only as a basis for further
negotiations between the Parties involved in the Free Trade Commission. Consequently, 
one can say that the NAFTA dispute settlement system is much more ‘power-orientated’ 
than the DSU of the WTO which is a quasi-judicial ‘rule-orientated’ system.18 Moreover, 
the NAFTA dispute settlement system lacks the main innovations of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, such as the possibility to appeal to the Appellate Body and the binding 
character of its rulings. However, one advantage of NAFTA is that its procedure is quicker 
than that under the DSU: after only 8 months suspension of benefits is possible, whereas 
under the DSU it takes more than 31 months before suspension of benefits is authorised.19 
 
5. Summary 
 
NAFTA has accomplished its main aim of creating a functioning FTA in a very short 
period of time, despite the large economic differences between Mexico and the other two 
member states. It is undisputed that NAFTA has significantly boosted trade between the 
NAFTA states.20 Nevertheless whether NAFTA has really been successful is still debated, 
especially in the USA.21 In particular, it is widely agreed that the environmental and labour 
side agreements of NAFTA have remained largely ineffective.22 The environment as well 
as the living and working conditions at the US-Mexican border have continuously been 
deteriorating since NAFTA entered into effect.23 
Politically speaking, NAFTA has failed to serve as a ‘hub’ that would invite other Latin 
American states to join NAFTA. In particular, the failure of the USA to let Chile accede to 
NAFTA has sent a negative signal in terms of the grand plans of establishing a FTAA.24 
Institutionally speaking, NAFTA remains firmly in the hands of the member states. 
NAFTA has no explicit international legal personality and exists with practically no 
organs. In addition, all decisions are taken by consensus and the di pute se tl ment system 
is not directly binding on the parties.  
 
II. Andean Community 
 
1. Current Status of Andean Community 
 
The history of the Andean Community is long and dates back to 1969.25 The Andean 
Community started as the Andean Group on the basis of the Cartagena Agreement 
compromising Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The purpose of this agreement 
was the establishment of Customs Union (CU) with a Common External Tariff (CET) by 
the end of 1980. In the meanti, Venezuela joined the Andean Group in 1973, while 
Chile withdrew from it in 1976. However, due to political and economic difficulties, the 
Andean Group never came close to achieving its objectives.  
But this changed in the beginning of the 1990s when new initiatives were taken to 
strengthen and enhance the Andean Group with the intention of finally achieving the 
original aims. Accordingly, in 1993 a Free Trade Zone between Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela became operational - albeit with many exceptions. Peru had 
temporarily suspended its obligations, but joined the Andean Group again in 1995.26 
In 1995, the CET at last entered into force, while in 1996 the name of the Andean Group 
was changed into Andean Community, reflecting a new stage of cooperation between the 
member states. Moreover, with the Protocol of Trujillo27 signed in 1996, the member states 
agreed to substantially improve the institutions of the Andean Community as well as to 
speed up the integration process.28 This Protocol created a comprehensive treaty of more 
than 150 Articles revealing many parallels to the EC Treaty.29 More recently, in 1998, the 
Andean Community and Mercosur signed a Framework Agreement30 regarding the creation 
of a Free Trade Area, encompassing practically the whole South American continent. 
Indeed, as a first step, agreement has been reached between on the one hand, the Andean 
Community and on the other hand, Brazil and Argentina on a Tariff Preference System.31 
Similarly, in 1998, a Framework Agreement on Cooperation32 between the EC and Andean 
Community member states was signed that could become the asis for the creation of an 
FTA between the two trade blocs. Most recently, the Andean Community has also 
launched negotiations with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (which are members of 
the Central American Common Market) to establish an FTA.33  
 
2. The Objectives of Andean Community 
 
The main objective of the Andean Community is the elimination of barriers to trade and the 
adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET) leading towards a Customs Union (CU).34 
Moreover, the agreement seeks to facilitate the participation of the Andean Community in 
the regional integration process, leading towards the gradual formation of a Latin American 
Common Market. Likewise, this agreement aims at reducing external vul erability and 
improving the position of the Member Countries within the international economic context.  
Article 3 of the Protocol of Trujillo describes, inter alia, the mechanisms and measures to 
be employed. The objectives are to be attained through the grad al harmonisation of 
economic and social policies and the approximation of national laws in relevant areas. 
Moreover, further trade liberalisation and the application of a CET are envisaged. The 
recent Sucre Protocol signed in 1997,35 reflects the commitment to enhance the integration 
efforts by adding a new provision calling for the intensification of integration with the 
other regional economic blocs as well as closer cooperation with other extra-regi nal 
systems.36 
 
3. The Institutions of Andean Community 
 
Before the entering into force of the Protocol of Trujillo, the Andean Pact consisted only of 
two main bodies, namely the Commission and the ‘Junta’. In addition, in 1979 the Court of 
Justice and the Andean Parliament were established.37 However, these institutions were 
replaced and improved by the so-called Andean Integration System (AIS) which is 
modelled on the EC institutions. The Andean Integration System consists of the follow ng 
bodies: 
· The Andean Presidential Council  
· The Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs  
· The Commission of the Andean Community  
· The General Secretariat  
· The Court of Justice of the Andean Community  
· The Andean Parliament  
as well as some other advisory councils and institutions.38  
 
a) The Andean Presidential Council 
 
The Andean Presidential Council is the highest-level body of the AIS.39 It consists of the 
Presidents of the Member Countries and is essentially responsible for defining the Andean 
integration policy.40 For this purpose, it issues Guidelines that must be implemented by the 
other bodies of the AIS.41 The Presidential Council meets once a year and the chairmanship 
rotates every year between the Member Countries. At the latest Presidential Council 
Meeting in June 2000, the Council adopted the ‘Act of Lima’ outlining the enhancement of 
the integration process in various policy areas.42 In particular, the Council repeated its 
determination to create an Andean Common Market by the year 2005, thus allowing the 
free circulation of goods, services, capital and persons. Even more important is the 
launching of a Common Foreign Policy of the Andean Community.  
 
b) The Andean Council of Foreign Ministers 
 
The Council consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member Countries. 
According to Article 16 Protocol of Trujillo, the Council is responsible for formulating the 
Member Countries’ foreign policy in matters of subregional interest as well as for 
coordinating the external relations of the organs of the Andean Integration System. 
Furthermore, the Council shall execute the Guidelines issued by the Presidential Council 
and formulate the general policy of the integration process. In view of the newly 
established Common Foreign Policy, the Council becomes particularly important for the 
coordination of joint positions of the Andean Community Member Countries in 
international forums and negotiations. 
The Council meets twice a year and the chairmanship rotates every year in accordance with 
the chairmanship of the Presidential Council.43 It can issue Declarations and Decisions of 
which the latter shall be binding and become part of the Andean Community Law.44  
In May 1999, the Council issued Decision 45845 containing the Common Foreign Policy 
Guidelines of the Andean Community. According to these Guidelines, the Common 
Foreign Policy is broadly understood as aiming at ‘defending and promoting the common 
identity, values, rights and interests’. More specifically, the Common Foreign Policy aims 
at strengthening peace and security and enhancing the negotiating position of the Member 
Countries in order to accelerate subregional integration. In addition, the consolidation of 
democracy and the rule of law, the promotion and respect of human rights, sustainable 
development and the fight against drugs, corruption and terrorism are mentioned. The 
Common Foreign Policy shall be executed through the adoption of common positions, joint 
actions and single spokesmanship. 
 
c) The Commission of the Andean Community 
 
The Commission is the main policy-making body of the Andean Integration System. It is 
made up of one plenipotentiary representative from each Member Country.46 Th  
Commission shares the legislative role with the Council of Foreign Ministers and is 
responsible for preparing, carrying out and evalu ting the integration process. For this 
purpose it takes the necessary measures to accomplish the objectives of the Cartagena 
Agreement and to carry out the Guidelines of the Presidential Council.47 I  so coordinates 
the joint positions of the Member Countries in international forums and negotiations.48 
Finally, the Commission approves the annual budget and sets the contributions of each 
Member Country. A chairman coming from the Member Country that chairs the 
Presidential Council also chairs the Commission for one year. The Commission meets on a 
regular basis three times a year. According to Article 26 Protocol of Trujillo, the 
Commission adopts its Decisions by affirmative vote of the absolute majority of th  
Member Countries.49  
 d) The General Secretariat of the Andean Community 
 
The General Secretariat is the executive body of the Andean Community and as such acts 
solely in accordance with the interests of the Andean Community.50 It is headed by a 
General Secretary who is appointed by consensus for a five-year period with the possibility 
of re-appointment once. He shall act only in the interest of the Community and may not 
seek or accept instructions from any government.51 The main task of the General 
Secretariat is to ensure the proper application of the Cartagena Agreement and the rules 
that make up Andean Community Law.52 Furthermore, the General Secretariat sh ll present 
drafts of Decisions to the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission.53 The legal 
acts issued by the General Secretariat are called Resolutions.54 
 
e) The Andean Parliament 
 
The Andean Parliament was established already in 1979 in Santafé de Bogota, Colombia. 
The Andean Parliament is the deliberative body of the AIS representing the peoples of the 
Andean Community. According to Article 43 Cartagena Agreement, the task of the 
Parliament is to participate in the integration process by suggesting to the other institutions 
actions or decisions to be taken in order to achieve the aims of the Andean Community. In 
other words, the Andean Parliament is only allowed to make non-binding recommendations 
to the other institutions, but is for the rest excluded from the decision- aking process. 
Currently, the Andean Parliament consists of representatives of the national parliaments of 
the Member Countries. The Parliament meets twice a year; the representativ s are l cted 
for a two-year period and may be re-el cted. In an Additional Protocol signed in 199755, 
the Member Countries agreed to improve the electoral representation of the Andean 
Parliament. According to the Additional Protocol, the representatives of the Andean 
Parliament shall be elected on the basis of a direct and universal vote, which should be held 
within five years. In each Member Country five representatives shall be elected for the 
Andean Parliament. 
 
f) The Court of Justice of the Andean Community 
 
Like the European Community, the Andean Community has created a Court of Justice 
situated in Quito, Ecuador.56 The Court of Justice consists of five judges who must be 
nationals of the Member Countries and fulfil the conditions for the highest judicial 
functions of their countries.57 The judges are appointed by unanimous decision from a list 
of three candidates submitted by each Member Country.58 They are appointed for a six-year 
term, they shall be renewed in part every three years and may be re-elected only once.59 
Quite interestingly, the Amending Protocol also foresees the possibility of creating the 
position of an Advocate General similar to that of the European Court of Justice.60 
 
4. The Andean Community Law 
 
Firstly, it should be mentioned that Andean Community is explicitly granted international 
legal capacity.61 Secondly, the Amending Protocol enumerates what makes up Andean 
Community Law.62 Thirdly, and more importantly, the Amending Protocol explicitly 
defines the legal effect of the various legal acts. Accordingly, Decisions approved by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers or the Commission become binding on the Member Countries 
as of the date of approval.63 In addition, Decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers or 
the Commission and Resolutions of the General Secretariat ar  directly applicable in the 
Member Countries as of the date of publication in the "Official Gazette"64, unless sp cified 
otherwise.65 Furthermore, when their text so stipulates, Decisions must be incorporated into 
national law through an express act stipulating the date of entry into force.  
Finally, Article 4 Amending Protocol obliges Member Countries to take such measures as 
may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Andean Community 
Law. The same provision also requires Member Countries to refrain from measures that 
might be contrary to or restrict the application of Andean Community Law. Thus, the 
Andean Community Law has supranational features that are quite similar to those of the 
European Community.  
 5. The Dispute Settlement 
 
All disputes between the Member Countries involving Andean Community Law must be 
settled before the Court of Justice of the Andean Community. The Court of Justice can be 
involved in five different procedures, which to a certain extent resemble those of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The three most important ones will be briefly outlined.66 
  
a) Nullity Action Procedure 
 
In a nullity action, a Member Country, the Council of Foreign Minist rs, the Commission 
or the General Secretariat can request the Court to declare the nullity of Decisions of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission or Resolutions of the General Secretariat 
or international agreements.67 Also, natural or legal persons may bring a nullity action 
against Decisions taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers or the Commission, 
Resolutions of the General Secretariat or international agreements that affect their 
subjective rights or their legitimate interests.68 The nullity action must be brought within a 
two-year time limit. If the Court finds a total or partial nullity of the challenged decision, 
the body which enacted that decision is required to take appropriate measures in order to 
effectively implement the judgement.69  
 
b) Non-Compliance Procedure 
 
In the Non-Compliance Procedure, the General Secretariat can bring a Member Country 
before the Court of Justice if it considers that a Member Country failed to comply with its 
obligations under Andean Community Law.70 Before that, the General Secretariat has to 
send its observations to the Member Country, which has the possibility to respond within 
60 days. After thelapse of the 60 days, the General Secretariat issues an administrative 
ruling that must include its reasoning. If the Member Country does not implement the 
administrative ruling, it can be brought before the Court of Justice. Also, natural or legal 
persons whose rights have been affected by the failure of the Member Country may appeal 
to the General Secretariat and to the Court.71 In this context Article 30 Amending Protocol 
should be noted, which states that a verdict of non-complia ce shall constitute sufficient 
grounds for the natural or legal person affected to ask the national judge for compensation 
for any damages or losses that may be due.  
 
c) Prejudgement Procedure 
 
Article 32 Amending Protocol confers on the Court the responsibility for giving 
prejudgement interpretations of Andean Community Law in order to ensure its uniform 
application in the Member Countries.72 Thu , national judges hearing cases in which 
provisions of Andean Community Law should be applied or are litigated, may directly 
request the Court's interpretation of such provisions, provided that the verdict is susceptible 
to appeal under national law.73 In proceedings in which no appeal under national law is 
possible anymore, the judge, either at his/her initiative or at the request of one of the 
parties, shall suspend the proceedings and directly request the Court's interpretation74, 
which the requesting judge must respect in his ruling.75 
 
6. Summary 
 
From the analysis above, it can be concluded that the Andean Community has finally made 
substantial progress towards achieving its aims and objectives.76 Although in theory the 
Andean Community looks impressive, in practice several unresolved points remain.77  
Economically speaking, the establishment of the FTA drastically increased the trade 
volume within the Andean Community as well as with countries outside, in particular th  
USA and EC.78 Despite that, the FTA is still not yet fully operational between all 
participating states, though Peru is on its way to becoming a full member of the FTA soon. 
Also, the Customs Union is still incomplete, as only three states (Colombia, Venezuela and 
Ecuador) have adopted the Common External Tariff (CET).79 Despite these shortcomings it 
can be expected that the establishment of a FTA with Mercosur as well as the FTAA will 
eventually eliminate th  remaining trade barriers.  
Politically speaking, the Andean Community is now able to develop an international profile 
by seriously developing a Common Foreign Policy. The ability to formulate joint positions 
and speak with one voice on the international pl ne will be particularly important in the 
ongoing negotiations as regards the creation of the FTAA. Institutionally speaking, the 
Andean Community has taken the appropriate steps to ensure that the integration process 
can continue smoothly.80 Legally speaking, the most exciting aspects are the supranational 
features of Andean Community Law (already the existence of this term is remarkable).81 In 
particular, the fact that most Decisions of the AIS are directly pplicable and the existence 
of a Court of Justice that has the power to annul them are unique in Latin America.82 
 
III. Mercosur 
 
1. Current Status of Mercosur 
 
In the Treaty of Asuncion83 signed on March 26, 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, the States Parties agreed to create a Common Market (Mercosur) by 1995.84 
The final institutional structure of Mercosur was defined in the Protocol of Ouro Preto85 
signed on December 17, 1994.86 Besides enhancing its institutional structure, the States 
Parties of Mercosur have recently taken various measures regarding the harmonisation of 
laws in areas such as investment, compe ition law, recognition of diplomas and judicial 
cooperation.87 Furthermore, Mercosur has been very active in extending its links to other 
regional trade blocs. As mentioned above, Mercosur is currently negotiating a unique 
Association Agreement with the EC. In addition, Mercosur has signed a Framework 
Agreement to establish an FTA with the Andean Community.88 Furthermore, Chile and 
Bolivia have become associated members of Mercosur, having concluded an agreement to
establish an FTA with Mercosur within 10 years.89 Fin lly, Mercosur is actively involved 
in the negotiations to create an FTAA. 
 
2. The Objectives of Mercosur 
 
According to Article 1 Treaty of Asuncion, the States Parties establish a Common Market, 
which shall be operational by December 31, 1994. The Common Market shall compromise 
the free movement of goods, services and factors of production between the member states. 
To this end, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff barriers is envisaged. 
Moreover, the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET), the adoption of a 
common trade policy and the coordination of positions in regional and international 
economic forums are aims to be achieved.90 
 
3. The Institutions of Mercosur 
 
During the transitional period, Mercosur consisted of only two organs: the Council of 
Common Market and the Common Market Group.91 However, with the Protocol of Ouro 
Preto the States Parties created several other organs.92 Article 1 of the Ouro Preto Protocol 
enumerates the following Mercosur organs: 
· The Council of Common Market  
· The Common Market Group  
· The Mercosur Trade Commission  
· The Joint Parliamentary Commission  
· The Economic-Social Consultative Forum  
· The Mercosur Administrative Secretariat.  
 
a) The Council of Common Market 
 
The Council of Common Market is the highest organ of Mercosur having the responsibility 
for the political leadership of the integration process.93 The Council consists of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Economy and shall take all necessary 
decisions to achieve the objectives of Mercosur.94 The Presidency of the Council rotates 
every six months and meets at least once every six months. Article 8 Protocol of Ouro 
Preto specifies the tasks of the Council which, inter alia, has the duty to supervise the 
implementation of Mercosur law, to rule on proposals submitted by the Common Market 
Group as well as to adopt financial and budgetary decisions. The legal acts of the Council 
are called Decisions, which are binding on the States Parties.95  
 
b) The Common Market Group 
 
The Common Market Group is the executive body of Mercosur.96 It consists of four 
members and four alternates from each country appointed by their own government. The 
Common Market Group has, inter alia, the tasks of monitoring compliance with Mercosur 
law, proposing draft Decisions to the Council of Common Market and taking the necessary 
measures to enforce the Decisions adopted by the Council of Common Market.97 The 
decisions of the Common Market Group are called Resolutions and shall be binding on the 
States Parties.98  
 
c) The Mercosur Trade Commission 
 
The Mercosur Trade Commission is responsible for assisting the Common Market Group 
in monitoring the application of the common trade policy instruments.99 The Mercosur 
Trade Commission also consists of four members and four alternates from each country. 
They meet at least once a year and its decisions are either in the form of Directives or 
Proposals, the latter shall be binding on the States Parties.100 
 
d) The Joint Parliamentary Commission, the Economic-Social 
Consultative Forum, the Secretariat 
 
The Joint Parliamentary Commission is the organ representing the parliaments of the 
Mercosur member states.101 It consists of equal numbers of representatives from each State 
Party and the members are appointed by their respective parliaments.102 The main duty of 
the Joint Parliamentary Commission is to speed up the internal procedures of their 
respective parliaments in order to ensure prompt implementation of the decisions of 
Mercosur organs.103 Additionally, the Joint Parliamentary Commission can submit 
Recommendations to the Council of Common Market through the Common Market 
Group.104 The Economic-Social Consultative Forum represents the economic and social 
sectors and is made up of equal numbers from each State Party. It shall issue 
Recommendations concerning economic and social issues of Mercosur.105 
Finally, the Administrative Secretariat of Mercosur is situated in Montevideo, Uruguay. It 
is responsible for all organisational and administrative tasks of Mercosur. 
 
4. Legal Aspects of Mercosur Law 
 
First, Article 34 Protocol of Ouro Preto bestows on Mercosur legal personality under 
international law. Second, Article 41 Protocol of Ouro Preto enumerates the legal sources 
of Mercosur Law, which are the treaties and protocols, the decisions of the Council, the 
Resolutions of the Common Market Group and the Directives of the Mercosur Trade 
Commission. Third, the decision-making process within all Mercosur organs takes place on 
the basis of consensus and in the presence of all States Parties.106 Fourth, Article 38 
Protocol of Ouro Preto requires the States Parties to take all necessary measures to ensure 
compliance with decisions adopted by the Mercosur organs. The legal acts of the Council 
of Common Market, the Common Market Group and the Mercosur Trad  C mmission are 
published in the "Official Journal" of Mercosur.107  
Finally, Article 40 Protocol of Ouro Preto provides for a special two- tep mechanism for 
the implementation and entry into force of Mercosur decisions.108 In the fir t step, after a 
Mercosur decision has been adopted, all four States Parties incorporate it into their 
domestic legal system and inform the Secretariat about it. In the second step, the Secretariat 
informs all States Parties that the decision has been incorporated in the legal system of all 
States Parties. After 30 days the decision becomes effective. In other words, before a 
Mercosur act can enter into force, it must first be incorporated in the national law of all 
States Parties (system of simultaneous implementation). This special mechanism excludes 
any supranational features of Mercosur law, such as primacy over the domestic law of the 
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States Parties or direct effect of Mercosur acts.109 
 
5. The Dispute Settlement 
 
The States Parties to Mercosur opted for the following dispute settlement procedure agreed 
upon in Decision No. 1/91 of the Council of the Common Market (also referred to as the 
Protocol of Brasilia for the solution of controversies).110 Es ntially, one can distinguish 
two different procedures: complaints by States Parties and complaints by private parties.111 
 
a) Complaints by States Parties 
 
The basic principle of the Mercosur dispute settlement process is to solve controversies 
through direct negotiations.112 However, Article 3 (2) Protocol of Brasilia limits the time 
for negotiations to 15 days. If no agreement can be found, any of the States Parties 
involved can submit the dispute for consideration to the Common Market Group.113 Within 
30 days the Common Market Group must conclude the procedure by presenting its 
Recommendations to the States Parties suggesting a solution.114 However, if the 
Recommendation does not solve the dispute, any State Party involved in the controversy 
can inform the Administrative Secretariat that it wants to resort to the arbitral procedure. 115 
Through Article 8 Protocol of Brasilia, the States Parties recognise as obligatory, ipso fact 
and without need of a special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, which is 
established on a case-by-case basis. 
The ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal is composed of three arbitrators, one of which is designated 
by each State Party to the dispute, the third one is chosen upon common agreement 
between the States Parties. The arbitrators should be named within 15 days and the third 
one shall preside over the Arbitral Tribunal.116 The arbitrators are chosen from a list of 10 
possible arbitrators submitted by each State Party.117 A second list of 16 arbitrators is put 
together by the Common Market Group from which the third arbi rator is selected in case 
the States Parties can not agree.118 For both lists, Article 13 Protocol of Brasilia requires 
that the arbitrators must be "jurists of recognised competence in those matters which can be 
the subject matter of a controversy". The Arbitral Tribunal has to issue its decision within 
60 days, which can be extended for an additional time limit of 30 days.119 The decision can 
be adopted by majority vote, but no dissenting opinion is allowed and the voting in the 
Tribunal is kept confidential.120 According to Article 21 Protocol of Brasilia, the decisions 
of the Arbitral Tribunal can not be appealed; they are binding on the States Parties to the 
dispute and must be complied with within 15 days unless otherwise stipulated in the ruling. 
Finally, Article 23 Protocol of Brasilia allows a State Party to adopt temporary 
compensatory measures, such as the suspension of concessions, if the other State Party to 
the dispute fails to comply with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal within 30 days. 
 
b) Complaints by Private Parties 
 
The Protocol contains a specific procedure allowing private parties (natural or legal 
persons) to file a complaint. The complaint must be a "resul of the sanction or application, 
by any State Parties of legal or administrative measures which have a restrictive, 
discriminatory or unfairly competitive effect", thereby violating Mercosur Law.121 
According to Article 26 Protocol of Brasilia, the affected private party must file its 
complaint, containing all relevant information, with the National Section of the Common 
Market Group of the State Party wherein they maintain their usual residency or where the 
company headquarters is based. The National Section can either initiate direct contact with 
the National Section of the State Party to which the violation is attributed, or it can refer it 
to the Common Market Group.122 If the Common Market Group does not reject the 
complaint, it will convene a group of three experts who shall issue a report within 30 
days.123 The report of the experts is then forwarded to the Common Market Group. If this 
report supports the complaint, any other State Party can demand that corrective measures 
be adopted or that the disputed measure be annulled. If this demand is not met within 15 
days, the State Party that demanded appropriate measures can then proceed directly to the 
arbitral procedure.124 Despite the existence of this dispute settlement system, it should be 
noted that so far only one arbitration award has been issued.125 Basically, the lack of an 
independent permanent organ that can issue enforceable and dir ctly binding decisions is 
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responsible for this situation.126 In addition, the fact that Mercosur organs themselves can 
not bring procedures against States Part ies that violate Mercosur Law, limits the effective 
enforcement of Mercosur Law. 
 
6. Summary 
 
Since intra-Mercosur trade surged substantially between 1991-1998,127 the main aim of 
Mercosur, namely, boosting trade between the member states, has been achieved. However, 
the FTA is not working entirely because many trade barriers between the States Parties 
have not yet been eliminated.128 Therefore, Mercosur is still labelled as an ‘incomplete’ 
CU.129 Indeed, States Parties have failed to implement a CET that applies to all products 
and sectors130 and still many exceptions remain in force.131 Moreover, due to the recent 
economic crisis in Brazil, the dominating country within Mercosur, the integration progress 
has slowed down. 132 Nevertheless or indeed because of the current crisis, Brazil and 
Argentina have recognised that the completion of the Mercosur integration project has 
become even more urgent. Accordingly, plans have been l unched for increased 
harmonisation of economic policies and even the creation of a monetary union ('little 
Maastricht') has been mentioned.133 Politically and institutionally speaking, Mercosur lacks 
supranational elements a d therefore depends on the will of the States Parties, in particular, 
the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina. This is seen as one of the most important 
shortcomings of Mercosur.134 Moreover, the lack of an independent and effective dispute 
settlement system enables the member states of Mercosur to undermine the creation of a 
fully functioning Common Market.135 Therefore, it remains to be seen whether Mercosur is 
sufficiently prepared for the ongoing negotiations as regards the FTAA and as regards the 
Asso ciation Agreement with the EC. 
 
C. Specific Integration Initiatives 
 
On the basis of the previous part, this section will focus on several integration initiatives 
that have been launched recently. Firstly, I will deal with the proposed establishment of a 
Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). Secondly, the establishment of an FTA between 
Mercosur and the Andean Community will be discussed. This is followed up by an analysis 
of the Association Agreement between Mercosur and the EC as well as the FTA between 
the Andean Community and the EC. Finally, I will deal with Chile and Mexico, two 
countries that pursue various interesting strategies in linking up with the various other trade 
blocs.  
 
I. Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) 
 
1. Overview 
 
The FTAA was launched with great pomp at the Miami Summit of the Americas in 
December 1994 under the auspices of the American President Clinton.136 The enthusiasm 
in the Western Hemisphere to establish a FTAA was immense after the initial success of 
NAFTA, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round resulting in the establishment of 
the WTO and the substantial progress achieved by both the Andean Community and 
Mercosur in establishing a Common Market.137 The creation of the FTAA would stretch 
from Alaska to Argentina, with a population of 730 million and a combined GDP of US 
Dollar 10 trillion, thus constituting the largest trading bloc in the world. 
However, the FTAA is intended to go beyond the creation of a simple FTA. The 
‘Declaration of Principles’ of the Miami Summit138 states that the FTAA shall constitute a 
‘partnership for development and prosperity’, leading towards democracy, free trade and 
sustainable development in the Americas. In other words, the FTAA encompasses, in 
addition to free trade, a number of different components. There is a political and security 
component in the sense that further economic integration would preserve and strengthen 
the democratic foundations of the participating states. Further, there is the prosperity 
component, implying that the creation of the FTAA will help to remove barriers to trade, 
thereby boosting trade and thus resulting in the elimination of poverty in the Americas. 
Finally, there is the sustainable development component, which shall ensure that further 
economic integration is facilitated in a way that is not detrimental to the environment. 
Moreover, the FTAA also aims at combining forces in order to fight against drugs and 
terrorism. To achieve all these aims, a detailed ‘Plan of Action’139 was attached to the 
‘Declaration of Principles’ of the Miami Summit. In the meantime, the preparations for 
starting the negotiations were finalised between 1995 and 1998, so that the negotiations 
officially started at the second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago in 1998.140 The 
negotiations are taking place in nine Negotiation Groups under the guidance of the Trade 
Negotiation Committee (TNC).141 It is planned that the negotiations shall be concluded 
before 2005. Indeed, drafting has progressed swiftly and a draft text of the FTAA will be 
discussed at the third Summit of the Americas taking place in Québec, on April 20-22, 
2001.142 
 
2. Prospects 
 
Although a draft text of the FTAA does not yet exist, it is possible - on the basis of the 
available negotiation results - to discuss several potentially problematic issues.143 A good 
indication of what the FTAA might look like can be found in the ‘General Principles and 
Objectives’ agreed to in the Ministerial Declaration of San José de Costa Rica in 1998.144 
The following points are of particular interest in the context of this contribution: 
· the FTAA shall be consistent with Article XXIV GATT (which means that 
substantially all tariff barriers must be eliminated between the FTAA members)  
· different trade liberalisation timetables may be negotiated  
· agriculture will be covered by FTAA, in particular, elimination of export subsidies  
· the aim is to establish a fair and transparent dispute settlement taking into account 
the WTO DSU and to promote the use of arbitration and alternative dispute 
settlement  
· the outcome of the negotiations of the FTAA shall be treated as parts of a single 
undertaking  
· the FTAA can co-exist with bilateral and sub-regional agreements  
· decisions in the FTAA negotiating process will be made by consensus.  
Past experience concerning the elimination of tariffs differs substantially as regards 
NAFTA, Mercosur and the Andean Community. Whereas the states parties of NAFTA 
were quite successful in reducing tariffs quickly, it took member states of Mercosur and the 
Andean Community much longer to reduce them substantially. Indeed, it is generally 
recognised and most likely - considering the vast differences in the economies of the FTAA 
member states - that variable timetables will be agreed upon for the elimination of tariffs 
within the FTAA.145  
The existence of a negotiating group on Agriculture for the FTAA shows that participating 
states are seriously intending to cover this sector as well. However, past experience within 
the GATT 1947, the WTO and the EC indicate that agriculture remains a problematic issue 
in many trade liberalisation projects. This is even more the case with regard to the FTAA, 
because most potential members of the FTAA are highly dependent on agriculture. Thus, it 
is reasonable to assume that progress will be slow on agriculture and stretched over a long 
transitional period.  
Moreover, due to the huge economic differences of the participating states, the 
environmental and social impact of an FTAA will be of particular importance. The 
example of Mexico joining NAFTA reveals that the elimination of trade barriers between 
developed and developing countries can have negative effects on the environment as well 
as on the living standards of the local population.146 The freeing of markets can easily 
result in a movement of companies to countries with the lowest environmental standards or 
with the least effective enforcement of environmental laws. The ‘maquiladora’ program is 
a clear example of this scenario. The purpose of the ‘maquiladora’ program was to limit 
environmental damages by concentrating plants at the US-Mexico border thereby enabling 
efficient enforcement of environmental laws. However, due to the lack of enforcement, this 
program turned into an environmental disaster because the emissions of the plants are 
concentrated at a relatively small area. Moreover, no infrastructure was provided for all the 
workers living next to the plants where they work. The situation has not been improved by 
NAFTA since the side agreements on environmental and labour standards have remained 
virtually ineffective.147 Therefore, the NAFTA side agreements are not useful models for 
regulating these issues within the FTAA negotiations.148 
 
Moreover, any regional integration model needs a fair and effective dispute settlement 
system.149 As has been discussed above, the dispute settlement systems of the three trade 
blocs are substantially different, ranging from non-binding panel decisions to binding 
decisions of a Court of Justice.150 Therefore, the question arises which dispute settlement 
model will be chosen for the FTAA. If one takes into account the dominant position of the 
USA within the FTAA negotiations, the dispute settlement system will probably be a 
panel-based model. However, the question remains whether it will be more a NAFTA-
based system (non-binding, power-o ientated) or more a WTO DSU-based system 
(binding, rule-orientated). Considering the aversion of the USA to binding legal 
adjudication by judicial or quasi-judicial international bodies, it seems to me, that the 
FTAA dispute settlement system will be modelled on the NAFTA system.151 Such a non-
binding panel mechanism would clearly be an advantage for the biggest participating 
FTAA member states such as USA and Brazil.152  
Finally, one important institutional issue that is still unresolved concerns the question of 
how the FTAA should be created.153 At the beginning of the negotiations it was generally 
assumed that Latin American states would successively join NAFTA, which at the end of 
the process would be converted into the FTAA. But, due to the failure to let Chile join 
NAFTA as the first Latin American country, this option has become unrealistic. Rather, it 
seems now that FTAA will probably be built on the two main regional blocs NAFTA and 
Mercosur, and the smaller Andean Community.154 However, the analysis above has shown 
that the three blocs differ considerably in many aspects. For instance, NAFTA has no 
international legal personality, whereas both Mercosur and the Andean Community have. 
Moreover, the objectives of the three regional trade blocs are clearly different. The Andean 
Community and Mercosur are - alb it incomplete - Customs Unions (CU) applying a 
Common External Tariff (CET), whereas NAFTA establishes only a FTA. Since the FTAA 
is intended to be only an FTA, the question arises: What will happen with the CET of 
Mercosur and the Andean Community?155 Additionally, in contrast to NAFTA, the other 
two blocs have sophisticated institutional structures, so the question arises: Is the FTAA 
going to remove them or will it establish comparable FTAA organs? However, probably 
the most critical point is the commitment of the USA to create the FTAA, which has 
become doubtful since President Clinton failed to obtain fast-track authority from the US 
Congress.156 In September 1998, the House of Representatives rejected the bill, thereby 
preventing the US President from negotiating a treaty alone, thus allowing the US Congress 
only to either accept or reject the negotiated treaty as a whole. 157 Consequently, whatever 
the 34 nations agree on, the FTAA will de factostand or fall with the vote of the US 
Congress.158 
 
II. Mercosur-Andean Community FTA 
 
1. Overview 
 
In April 1998, Mercosur and the Andean Community signed a Framework Agreement for 
the creation of an FTA between them.159 This agreement stipulates that until September 30, 
1998 a Tariff Preference Agreement should be negotiated, which will be followed by 
negotiations for the creation of an FTA that should enter into force on January 1, 2000. 
However, so far these negotiations have remained unsuccessful. Consequently, in March 
1999, Brazil - as the most powerful member state of Mercosur - d cided to negotiate 
unilaterally a Tariff Preference Agreement with the Andean Community.160 In fact, Brazil 
and the Andean Community have concluded such an agreement, which entered into force 
in August 1999. This Tariff Preferenc  Agreement provides for the reduction of tariffs for a 
large number of products.161 Similarly, Argentina has recently concluded a comparable 
Tariff Preference Agreement with the Andean Community that entered into force in August 
2000.162  
 
2. Prospects 
 
Economically speaking, the link-up between the Andean Community and Mercosur is the 
next logical step in reducing barriers to trade, thereby integrating the economies of the 
South American continent. However, the negotiations are not progressing as expected, 
because many member states of both blocs are unwilling to open up their markets. In 
particular, the agricultural and automotive sectors are obstacles in the negotiations. But the 
Tariff Preference agreem nt with Brazil and the almost completed negotiations with 
Argentina could facilitate the conclusion of similar agreements with the rest of the 
Mercosur member states, thus paving the way for an FTA. Politically speaking, it would be 
very useful if both blocs could establish a functioning FTA soon. The FTA would force 
economic and legal convergence that could serve as preparation for joining the FTAA. This 
would also increase their bargaining-power against NAFTA in the FTAA negotiations. 
Despite these obvi us advantages of further regional integration, the volatile economic and 
political situation in many Latin American countries makes it impossible to forecast 
whether and when the various negotiations will turn into results.  
 
III. Mercosur-EC Interregional Association 
 
1. Overview 
 
Formal links between Mercosur and the EC date back to the Interinstitutional Cooperation 
Agreement between the Common Market Council and the EC Commission of May 1992.163 
The main purpose of that agreement was the transfer of know-how as regards the 
integration process from EC institutions towards Mercosur institutions.164 Soon afterwards, 
the next stage of cooperation was reached in December 1995 by the conclusion of the 
Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between Mercosur and the EC and its 
Member States.165 The main objective of this agreement is to prepare the conditions 
enabling an interregional association between the EC and Mercosur.166 In particular, it 
should be noted that the agreement is not limited to trade only, but rather calls for 
cooperation in a large variety of policy areas such as transport, energy, environment, 
education, drug-trafficking etc. 167 In order to attain these objectives, the treaty establishes 
a Cooperation Council composed of the members of the EC Council and the EC 
Commission as well as members of the Common Market Council and Common Market 
Group.168 However, it took about 4 years before the agreement entered into force and the 
first meeting of the Cooperation Council took place.169 The n gotiations are managed by 
the Biregional Negotiations Committee, which oversees the negotiation process in the 
Subcommittee on Cooperation as well as in the Technical Groups.170 So far, the Biregional 
Negotiations Committee has met three times. In the first meeting, held in April 2000, the 
Committee agreed on several basic points. 171 In particular, the parties agreed that the 
negotiations should not exclude any sector and should be in accordance with WTO rules. 
Moreover, the results should constitute a single undertaking and be implemented as an 
indivisible whole. To this end, the Committee set up three Subgroups specifying general 
orientations for each of them.172 In the second meeting held in June 2000, the discussions 
have focused on several issues that seem to be particularly problematic. As regards the EC, 
the common agricultural policy and the enlargement process were at issue, while as regards 
Mercosur, the service sector and public procurement were discussed.173 In the third meeting 
of the EU-Mercosur Negotiations Committee which took place in November 2000, 
substantial progress on the negotiations has been reported with first draft texts being 
circulated and discussed.174 
 
2. Prospects 
 
Considering the fact that the EC is the most important trading partner of Mercosur and that 
Mercosur is the largest Latin American market for EC exports, it is only logical that the 
two trade blocs are seeking closer economic relations.175 For the EC it is even more 
important to ensure that it consolidates its position on the Mercosur market, because the 
creation of the FTAA could give the USA a powerful position in Latin America, which 
could challenge the dominant trade position of the EC.176  
Comparing the FTAA initiative with the link-up between the EC and Mercosur, it seems at 
first sight that the latter might be easier to achieve. One reason for this is that fewer 
countries are involved in the negotiation process and no fa t-tr ck problems arise. Second, 
the historic, cultural and economic links between Spain, Portugal, Brazil and Argentina 
might help the negotiation process. Also, there is a certain distrust and fear of American 
dominance in some Latin American countries, which makes the EC an attractive alternative 
partner. Third, Mercosur has an institutional structure that slightly resembles the one of the 
EC, which would facilitate the cooperation with the comparable EC institutions. Moreover, 
the final aim of Mercosur of establishing a Common Market involving the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and workers is complementary to the single market of the EC. 
However, there is one important stumbling block and that is agriculture.177 Despite the 
agreement that no sector shall be excluded in the negotiations between the EC and 
Mercosur, pressure within the EC to exclude agriculture from the negotiation agenda is 
huge.178 This is especially so since 60 per cent of all Mercosur exports to the EU are 
agricultural products.179 Consequently, the elimination of tariff and non-t riff barriers to 
agricultural imports from Mercosur would substantially increase the pressure on European 
farmers. Considering the fact that the EC itself has still not tackled the problem of 
eliminating subsidies for its agricultural sector, this issue could indeed slow down the 
negotiation process. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that agriculture will be 
excluded or included only with a long transitional period. Also, the preoccupation of the 
EU with enlargement towards Eastern and Central Europe inevitably puts the integration 
process with Mercosur in second place.180 
In sum, the Association Agreement would be highly interesting because it would constitute 
the first association between two trade blocs. Without doubt, the economic and political 
gains for both sides would be enormous, although politically, not all EC Member States 
support it. Also, the fact that no deadline for the negotiations has been fixed creates the 
impression that this will be a long-term project. Finally, it has so far remained unclear what 
exactly this association would entail.181 Nevertheless, the FTAA negotiations might 
increase the pressure, particularly within the EC, to conclude the negotiations before the 
FTAA is established. 
 
IV. Andean Community-EC Framework Cooperation Agreement 
1. Overview 
 
The member states of the Andean Community started form l cooperation links with the EC 
in 1984 with the conclusion of a Cooperation Agreement.182 This agreement which 
contained rather general programmatic intentions, was recently replaced by a more far-
reaching Framework Agreement on Cooperation between the EC and the Andean 
Community member states.183 The main aim of this Framework Agreement is to strengthen 
economic cooperation between the two trade blocs. Moreover, additional areas of 
cooperation are m ntioned such as industrial cooperation, investment, technology, 
transport, telecommunication, environment etc. The Joint Committee established already 
under the Cooperation Agreement is also going to manage the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement.184 
 
2. Prospects 
 
Although, this cooperation initiative is far less ambitious then the establishment of an FTA, 
it is nevertheless an important step for the EC to strengthen its position on the Andean 
market. Admittedly, Mercosur is a much larger and thus more important market, the 
Andean Community is nevertheless of strategic importance for the EC. Conversely, the 
Andean Community is interested in improving its economic relations with the EC, because 
it remains uncertain whether and when the planned FTA with Mercosur and the FTAA will 
be implemented. Although currently the Andean Community is concentrating more on the 
negotiations for the FTA with Mercosur and the FTAA, it has expressed hopes that the 
General System of Preferences (GSP) which the EC applies to all Andean Community 
member states could be transformed permanently into an association agreement in 2005.185  
In sum, the Andean Community is lagging behind Mercosur regarding its economic 
relations with the EC. However, the many legal and institutional similarities between the 
Andean Community and the EC might facilitate the development of closer economic and 
political ties. This would especially be the case, if the Andean Community and Mercosur 
succeded in establishing an FTA and the EC finalised the Association Agreement with 
Mercosur. In that case, it would make sense for the EC to conclude a similar Association 
Agreement with the Andean Community. In this way, the EC would be able to ensure that 
EC exports have free access to the whole South American market. 
 
V. Chile and Mexico 
 
1. Chile 
 
Chile has one of the most robust economies of all Latin American countries.186 
Accordingly, Chile has long been tipped as one of the first Latin American states to join 
NAFTA. However, resistance by the American Congress resulted in a halt to the 
negotiation process.187 
 
Despite this, Chile has concluded FTAs with Mexico and Canada in order to gain access to 
the NAFTA market and to facilitate its membership in NAFTA.188 Besides the 
establishment of an FTA between Chile and Canada, both countries have also concluded 
environmental and labour cooperation agreements similar to the NAFTA side 
agreements.189 In addition to its efforts to join NAFTA, Chile started to look around for 
other attractive partners. Thus, Chile has been an associated member of Mercosur since 
October 1, 1996. It is a comprehensive treaty190 that contains a detailed timetable for the 
elimination of all tariffs within 10 years, which would result in an FTA between Chile and 
Mercosur.191 Nontheless, there are a number of annexes attached to the treaty containing 
lists of exceptions and special provisions for sensitive products.  
However, the interests of Chile are not confined to the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, 
Chile is currently negotiating an Association Agreement with the EC, on the basis of the 
1996 Framework Cooperation Agreement192 between Chile and the EC. In November 1999, 
the first EU-Chile Joint Council meeting took place to prepare the ground for the 
negotiations.193 In April 2000, the EU-Chile Negotiations Committee met for the first time. 
Similar to the ongoing negotiations between the EC and Mercosur, the EU-Chile 
Negotiations Committee has also established three subgroups and the same general 
principles and objectives have been agreed upon.194 In the meantime, the second meeting 
took place in April 2000195, while in the third meeting which was held in November 2000, 
first draft texts were discussed.196 Parallel to the next meeting between the EU and 
Mercosur, the EU-Chile Negotiation Committee will also meet in March 2001 in Brussels. 
In sum, it becomes apparent that Chile is trying to strengthen its links with all three major 
trade blocs (NAFTA, Mercosur and EC), thereby ensuring maximum advantages for its 
economy. 
 
2. Mexico 
 
Mexico is also busy broadening its access to various regional trade blocs.197 As m nti ned 
above, Mexico established an FTA with Chile, which entered into force in August 1999.198 
The treaty contains a detailed timetable for the elimination of tariffs until the end of 2005. 
Moreover, the treaty is comprehensive, covering all trade areas as well as containing rules 
for dispute settlement. The FTA with Chile is particularly important in view of Chile’s 
association with Mercosur, which would also give Mexican exports access to the large 
Mercosur market. This is especially important, because the negotiations between Mexico 
and Mercosur to become an associate member of Mercosur have so far remained 
unsuccessful. Consequently, Mexico has switched over to bilateral negotiations with 
individual Mercosur member states in order to achieve tariff reductions.199  
Further, Mexico has also strengthened its links with the EC. Formal relations between 
Mexico and the EC date back to the Cooperation Agreement of 1991.200 I  December 1997, 
Mexico and the EC signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership, Political Coordination 
and Cooperation agreement (also referred to as Global Agreement) in order to liberalise 
trade and increase high-level contacts.201 For the purpose of speeding up the application of 
the parts of the Global Agreement concerning trade and trade-related matters, the parties 
signed an Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related aspects, which entered into force 
in July 1998.202 This Interim Agreement launched formal Mexican-EU negotiations for 
establishing an FTA within 10 years. Hence, negotiations took place between 1998 and 
1999, which were grouped in three main areas: (i) trade in goods, (ii) services and capital 
movements and (iii) public procurement, competition, intellectual property rights and 
dispute settlement. On 1st July 2000, Decision 2/2000 of the EC-M xico Joint Council 
entered into force adopting the negotiation results regarding the establishment of an FTA 
between the EC and Mexico.203 This decision lays down detailed provisions as regards the 
reduction of tariffs, public procurement, cooperation in competition, intellectual property 
rights and dispute settlement. In particular, the Decision contains a detailed timetable for 
the subsequent elimination of all customs dties for non-agricultural products by 2007 at 
the latest. This will, in effect, put EC non-agricultural imports into Mexico on the same 
footing as imports from the other NAFTA states. Concerning agricultural products, a 
review is planned within 3 years after entry into force of the Decision in order to determine 
steps for the liberalisation of this sector. As for the resolution of disputes, the Decision 
embodies a panel-based system comparable to the NAFTA dispute settlement system.  
In sum, Mexico is applying a similar diversifying strategy as Chile. However, after its 
initial success in joining NAFTA, Mexico has so far not been able to forge similar ties with 
Mercosur. But the FTAs with Chile and in particular with the EC will over time broaden its 
access to other markets, thereby reducing its dependence on NAFTA.  
 
D. Outlook 
 
As this contribution has shown, the past decade has tremendously changed the integration 
architecture of the Americas. The next years will be even more important in shaping the 
economic, social and political future of the Americas. 
At the subregional level, the first priority will be to further reduce and eliminate tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade in order to establish a fully operational FTA, and at a later stage 
a CU between Mercosur and the Andean Community. This would be a first important step 
towards the creation of an FTAA. Therefore, Mercosur and the Andean Community must 
enhance their integration efforts in order to prepare the South American continent to face 
the competition of the NAFTA member states. Apart from the economic side, the 
strengthening of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as the improvement 
of the social and environmental situation are equally important. The Mexican experience is 
a clear example that growth alone is - in the long run - ot enough. 
At the regional level, for the EC as well as for the USA, the South American continent 
offers huge economic possibilities in terms of exports and investment. Thus, it is only 
logical that a race has started between the two to ‘conquer’ Latin America.204 The 
negotiations on the FTAA and the Association Agreement between Mercosur and the EC 
are the ‘cars’ used in this race and the critical deadline is set at the year 2005. As regards 
the FTAA, its realisation will depend on political and economic factors. Politically, the 
election of George W. Bush as the new US President as well as the traditional resistance of 
the US Congress will probably slow down the FTAA negotiation process in Québec.205 
Economically, the crisis in Brazil, which has affected the rest of Mercosur, makes further 
tariff concessions and the liberalisation of markets much more difficult to implement.206 
At the global level, the proliferation of all these planned FTAs and CUs could endanger the 
position of the WTO as the global trade system. In particular, the recent failure of the 
Seattle Ministerial conference indicates that progress may be achieved more easily on the 
regional or subregional level. However, the WTO itself is partly responsible for the 
unprecedented increase in proposed FTAs and CUs, because no serious review of them 
takes place within the WTO as is required by Article XXIV GATT.207 This is quite logical 
since the EC and the USA are actively involved in creating many of the new FTAs and 
therefore prefer not to be constrained by the WTO.208 Be that as it may, the legal cohesion 
between WTO rules and the provisions of the numerous FTAs and CUs could be seriously 
undermined.  
In conclusion and referring to the remark in the subtitle, this contribution has shown that 
positive results have been produced and that the integration process in the Americas works 
- albeit not to the fullest extent possible. Thus - although a lot of work still has to be done - 
the integration process has been of value and will be even more valuable in the near future. 
Therefore, it is important for all who are interested in int rnatio al trade law to follow the 
exciting developments in the Americas. 
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